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“Stealing Sunshine” is a trial-advocacy technique whereby an attorney 
discloses, in the opening statement or on direct examination of a witness, 
information that seems advantageous to the opponent’s case, before the latter 
elicits or reveals it, in order to mitigate its expected impact on fact-finders. We 
hypothesize that stealing sunshine is indeed helpful to a litigant’s case. This 
study is the first to examine the efficacy of this tactic, both theoretically and 
empirically, contributing to the growing literature on the impact of various trial-
advocacy techniques on decision-makers’ perceptions and trial outcomes.1 
Given the primacy of our work, we draw on existing literature on a related 
courtroom technique commonly known as “stealing thunder,” which is—in a 
sense—the mirror image of the tactic under scrutiny. 
II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Stealing Thunder 
James W. McElhaney was probably the first to use the term “stealing 
thunder” to describe a trial technique in which an attorney divulges information 
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 1. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The 
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1353, 1357, 1380–85 (2009) (finding significant association between the jury’s learning of a 
criminal record and conviction in cases with weak evidence); see also id. at 1358–64 (surveying prior 
research on the impact of knowing a defendant’s criminal record on jurors’ and judges’ guilt 
perceptions and verdicts); Joseph L. Gastwirth & Michael D. Sinclair, A Re-Examination of the 1966 
Kalven–Zeisel Study of Judge–Jury Agreements and Disagreements and Their Causes, 3 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 169, 174 (2004) (finding, based on data presented in HARRY KALVEN & HANS 
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966), that in “close” cases a superior defense counsel, a sympathetic 
defendant, and prior criminal record affect judgments and generate disagreement between jurors and 
judges). 
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that is detrimental to her case, such as evidence that impairs the credibility of her 
own witness, before it is elicited or revealed by the opponent.2 For example, in a 
criminal trial, the defendant’s attorney may bring out the defendant’s prior 
record on direct examination.3 Similarly, in a civil trial, an attorney may reveal 
that her own expert witness expressed an opposite opinion in a previous case.4 
In so doing, the attorney aspires to take out at least some of the sting of the 
opponent’s case.5 
Disclosing harmful information about oneself is sensible only as a 
preemptive measure. If P’s opponent is not likely to reveal the harmful 
information, neither should P, because a litigant will generally be better off if 
evidence that might impair her case is not revealed at all. Put differently, no-
thunder is preferable to any alternative.6 But under conventional wisdom 
stealing thunder is preferable to thunder, although both are inferior to no-
thunder.7 A common piece of advice in trial-advocacy manuals is that where a 
weakness is apparent and known to the opponent, and the opponent is likely to 
use it, “you should volunteer it. If you don’t, your opponent will, with twice the 
impact.”8 Trial lawyers have endorsed and utilized this advice before its validity 
has been empirically tested.9 
From a theoretical perspective, the efficacy of stealing thunder is open to 
question. On the one hand, there are good reasons to believe that it works. First 
and foremost, a person who reveals information that seems against her best 
interest is deemed more credible.10 Clearly, revealing negative information will 
 
 2. James W. McElhaney, Stealing Their Thunder, 13 LITIG., Spring 1987, at 59, 59. 
 3. Id. at 60; see also JAMES W. MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 519 (3d ed. 
1994); James A. Protin, What Is a “Crime Relevant to Credibility”?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1995); 
Kipling D. Williams et al., The Effects of Stealing Thunder in Criminal and Civil Trials, 17 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 597, 600–03 (1993). Note that in the U.S. federal system, a criminal defendant who 
preemptively introduces evidence of prior convictions on direct examination waives the right to appeal 
an in limine ruling allowing the prosecutor to use such evidence. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 
760 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Kipling D. Williams & Lara Dolnik, Revealing the Worst First: Stealing Thunder as a 
Social Influence Strategy, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: DIRECT AND INDIRECT PROCESSES 213, 217 (Joseph 
P. Forgas & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2001); Williams et al., supra note 3, at 603–07. 
 5. McElhaney, supra note 2, at 59. 
 6. See THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 47–48 (3d ed. 1992) 
(“There is obviously no point in volunteering a weakness that would never be raised at trial.”). 
 7. See, e.g., L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking Boils, Preserving Error: On the Horns of a Dilemma After 
Ohler v. United States, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 615, 616 (2001) (“Conventional wisdom advises trial 
advocates to disclose the weaknesses in their cases at trial before the other side has the opportunity to 
exaggerate their significance in the case.”); Michael J. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying 
Cases Without Knowing What Works or Why, 101 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 (1992) (book review) 
(“Conventional tactical wisdom holds that we should try to present the information to the jury before 
our adversary gets the chance to, so as to ‘take the sting out’ of the evidence or increase the perception 
of our credibility or fairness.”). 
 8. MAUET, supra note 6, at 48; see also Williams et al., supra note 3, at 597. 
 9. See Perrin, supra note 7, at 621; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 597–98. 
 10. See NEIL BREWER & KIPLING D. WILLIAMS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 312 (2005); Lara Dolnik et al., Stealing Thunder as a Courtroom Tactic Revisited: 
Processes and Boundaries, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 267, 269 (2003); Perrin, supra note 7, at 617, 620; 
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prove futile if it incriminates the counsel’s client, or contradicts one of the 
counsel’s own witnesses. But as long as the harmful information is of secondary 
importance, disclosing it strengthens the speaker’s overall credibility with 
respect to the more important issues. Second, stealing thunder enables the 
lawyer to frame the evidence in the least harmful way to the client: “The key is 
to mention the weakness without emphasis and to present it in its least 
damaging light . . . .”11 Third and closely related, stealing thunder enables the 
lawyer to “warn” fact-finders about the upcoming harmful evidence, thereby 
making them more resistant to its submission by the opponent.12 The presumed 
psychological effect of warning and framing may be analogous to the 
physiological effect of immunization through the preemptive administration of 
weakened pathogens.13 Fourth, according to the commodity theory, the scarcer 
the information, the more valuable it is. If a piece of information is provided by 
both parties, it is less scarce and hence, less significant (“old news is no news”).14 
Fifth, when one reveals negative information about oneself, the addressees 
endeavor to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the representation and 
what they expect that person to present by changing the significance or meaning 
of the representation to better fit their expectation.15 
On the other hand, there are good reasons to believe that the tactic might be 
detrimental to one’s client. First, due to the primacy effect and the confirmation 
bias, information heard earlier in the trial may set up a negative schema of the 
witness that fact-finders will use to interpret subsequent evidence they hear.16 
Second, assuming that the opponent will use the negative evidence anyway, 
stealing thunder increases its salience and hence, its availability.17 Information 
mentioned twice is more easily remembered, and may thus have a stronger 
impact. Third, endorsing the negative information reinforces its veracity, 
turning it into undisputed evidence to the client’s detriment.18 
The first empirical study of the effectiveness of stealing thunder was 
published in 1993.19 The study showed that by stealing the opponent’s thunder, 
one gains credibility, and is consequently treated more favorably by fact-
finders. The tactic was found equally effective in criminal and civil trials, 
whether used by the defendant or by the prosecutor or plaintiff. While stealing 
 
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 
60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 389–90 (2008); Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598. 
 11. MAUET, supra note 6, at 48; see also Perrin, supra note 7, at 617, 621; Stanchi, supra note 10, at 
388, 418; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598. 
 12. See Stanchi, supra note 10, at 388, 418; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 598–99. 
 13. See Stanchi, supra note 10, at 399–408, 418 (discussing the inoculation theory). 
 14. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 269; Stanchi, supra note 10, at 420; Williams et al., supra 
note 3, at 599. 
 15. See BREWER & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 312; Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 269–70; 
Stanchi, supra note 10, at 420; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 599. 
 16. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 600. 
 17. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268; Williams et al., supra note 3, at 600. 
 18. See Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 268. 
 19. Williams et al., supra note 3. 
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thunder emerged and was initially studied as a courtroom technique, 
subsequent studies have demonstrated its efficacy in other contexts, such as 
interpersonal relationships,20 organizational crisis management,21 and politics.22 
More recent studies examined possible explanations for these results. For 
instance, while the initial study found that the effect of the tactic may be 
attributed to enhanced credibility,23 another found that stealing thunder may be 
effective even if it does not change the fact-finder’s perception of the witness’s 
credibility.24 The latter also suggests that stealing thunder may be equally and at 
times more effective without framing the harmful information in a way that 
reduces its importance.25 It remains unclear why this is so, and under what 
circumstances, if any, framing may augment the effect of stealing thunder.26 
Research has also raised doubts about the “old news is no news” argument, 
finding that non-repetition of the negative information by the opponent did not 
diminish the effect of stealing thunder.27 Finally, there is some empirical support 
for the hypothesis that in cases of stealing thunder, fact-finders change the 
meaning of the representation to better fit their expectation.28 
The boundaries of the tactic’s efficacy have also been explored. For 
example, the initial study examined whether the effectiveness of the tactic 
depended on the exact timing of its use, namely early or relatively late in trial 
(but prior to the thunder), and found that stealing thunder was equally effective 
irrespective of the exact timing.29 On the other hand, “acknowledging thunder” 
(after the opponent has already revealed the negative information) is 
ineffective.30 Two studies found that stealing thunder reduced the damaging 
impact of negative information even when the information was relatively 
 
 20. See, e.g., Alvin Law, Stealing Thunder from HIV: Understanding the Processes Behind Timing 
the Disclosure of HIV to Potential Relationship Partners (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Purdue University) (on file with Purdue University); Kathy Zablocki, Stealing Thunder About Having 
a Sexually Transmitted Disease (1996) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Toledo). 
 21. See, e.g., Laura M. Arpan & David R. Roskos-Ewoldsen, Stealing Thunder: Analysis of the 
Effects of Proactive Disclosure of Crisis Information, 31 PUB. REL. REV. 425 (2005); Laura M. Arpan & 
Donnalyn Pompper, Stormy Weather: Testing “Stealing Thunder” as a Crisis Communication Strategy to 
Improve Communication Flow Between Organizations and Journalists, 29 PUB. REL. REV. 291 (2003). 
 22. See, e.g., Sherri A. Ondrus, Scooping the Press: Reducing Newspaper Coverage of Political 
Scandal By Stealing Thunder (May 1998) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toledo) (on 
file with University of Toledo). 
 23. Williams et al., supra note 3, at 602–03. 
 24. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 283, 285. But cf. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 1, at 1361, 1387–
88 (noting that “[a]lthough the defendant’s credibility can be harmed by knowledge of a [criminal] 
record, credibility does not appear to be the main way that criminal record information affects the guilt 
judgments of jurors.”). 
 25. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 270–75, 283, 285; see also Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 
221–22. 
 26. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 285. 
 27. Id. at 278–79, 283, 285. 
 28. Id. at 278–79, 283–84. 
 29. Williams et al., supra note 3, at 603–07. 
 30. Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 220. 
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severe.31 However, it seems reasonable to assume that from a certain level of 
severity, stealing thunder might become counterproductive. As we stated 
above, revealing negative information is injudicious if it incriminates the 
counsel’s client, or contradicts one of the counsel’s own witnesses. 
Other studies have examined whether the effectiveness of stealing thunder 
is affected by the personal characteristics of the stealer (for example, race)32 or 
the fact-finder (for example, motivation and ability to process information).33 
The opponent’s use of counterstrategies has also been investigated. For 
instance, non-repetition of the negative information by the opponent (that is, 
ignoring) did not diminish the effect of stealing thunder.34 In contrast, it was 
found that one’s opponent can mitigate the effect of the tactic by explaining the 
manipulation to the fact-finders.35 
B.   Stealing Sunshine 
Hitherto, empirical studies have focused on preemptive disclosure of 
negative information about oneself (that is, stealing thunder). Our study offers 
a preliminary examination of the related yet unexplored technique of “stealing 
sunshine.” From a theoretical perspective, stealing sunshine is analogous to 
stealing thunder in many respects. On the one hand, a person who reveals 
information that seems against his best interest may be deemed generally more 
credible and therefore more persuasive.36 Stealing sunshine also enables the 
lawyer to frame the evidence in the least beneficial way to the opponent,37 and 
to “warn” fact-finders about the upcoming evidence, thereby making them 
more resistant to its submission by the opponent. If a piece of information is 
provided by both parties, it is less scarce and hence, less valuable.38 And when 
one reveals positive information about one’s opponent, the addressees 
endeavor to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the representation and 
 
 31. Id. at 220–21 (examining the 2003 Baldwin and Williams study on stealing thunder in a political 
context). 
 32. Id. at 222–23 (examining the 1994 White and Harkins study and the 1999 Petty, Flemming, and 
White study indicating that race attributed to the source of a persuasive message). 
 33. Id. at 223–24 (analyzing the 1995 Ondrus and Williams study investigating stealing thunder in 
the political domain). 
 34. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 278–79, 283, 285; Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 224–25. 
 35. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 276–79, 283, 285; Williams & Dolnik, supra note 4, at 224–25. 
 36. We explained that evidence concerning the possible effect of stealing thunder on witness and 
lawyer credibility is inconclusive. See supra notes 10, 23–24 and accompanying text. So if stealing 
sunshine is truly effective, the hypothesis that its effectiveness may be attributed to enhanced credibility 
merits further research. 
 37. Indeed, the evidence on stealing thunder suggests that framing might not matter. See supra 
notes 25–26 and accompanying text. But we believe that the body of evidence on this issue is currently 
sparse. Moreover, it relates to a specific type of framing in a very specific context. In our view, it cannot 
and should not be used to draw broad conclusions. 
 38. Again, although evidence on stealing thunder suggests that scarcity might not matter (see supra 
note 27 and accompanying text), the evidence is too sparse to be conclusive. 
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what they expect that person to present by changing the significance or meaning 
of the representation to better fit their expectation. 
On the other hand, due to the primacy effect and the confirmation bias, 
information heard earlier in the trial may set up a positive schema of the 
opponent that fact-finders will use to interpret subsequent evidence they hear. 
Assuming that the opponent will use the positive information anyway, stealing 
sunshine increases its salience and hence, its availability. And endorsing the 
positive information reinforces its veracity, turning it into undisputed evidence. 
Additionally, research shows that people hearing secondhand information make 
more extreme judgments of the target person than people hearing the 
information firsthand from the target person. In several experiments, first-order 
listeners watched the target person describe reprehensible actions that he or she 
committed, and then told the story to second-order listeners. The second-order 
listeners rated the target more negatively than first-order listeners. This 
phenomenon is known as the teller-listener extremity effect,39 and has also been 
observed in cases of disclosure of positive information.40 It has been suggested 
that one of the explanations for this phenomenon, possibly the strongest, is that 
boasting affects the general impression (or liking) of a person. First-order 
listeners hear the information in first-person form (“I”), and may think the 
target person was boasting, whereas second-order listeners hear the information 
in third-person form (“She” or “He”) and are less likely to think the target was 
boasting.41 So theoretically, an attorney would better serve the interests of his 
client by letting the opponent reveal the positive information about the client. 
This sheds doubts on the efficacy of stealing sunshine. 
Taking into consideration existing literature on stealing thunder, we 
hypothesize that stealing sunshine is comparably helpful to a litigant’s case. If 
we are correct, volunteering positive information about the client’s opponent 
may be consistent with the attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy. 
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the defendant reveals positive information about himself. Forty participants 
received the Stealing Sunshine version, in which the prosecutor reveals the 
same information about the defendant. 
Materials. The cases presented were based on those used by Lara Dolnik 
and fellow researchers in 2003 for their first study. The defendant was driving 
home from a party. He was involved in a head-on collision with another car on 
a winding, unlit road at 3:00 a.m. The defendant incurred minor injuries, but the 
other driver, a young woman, died after being trapped in the car with her two-
year-old child. The child survived with minor injuries. The defendant was then 
charged with causing death by dangerous driving.44 The main modification was 
that the relevant information about the defendant, revealed by a different party 
in each of the two conditions, was advantageous to the defendant (that is, 
sunshine), not detrimental (that is, thunder). In the Sunshine condition, the 
defendant revealed positive information about himself, that is, he had no 
criminal record, not even a traffic violation, and was a volunteer for a non-profit 
traffic-safety organization. In the Stealing Sunshine condition, the same positive 
information was revealed by the prosecutor. 
Admittedly, the structure of our Stealing Sunshine condition may seem 
unrealistic. The defendant would normally reveal positive information about 
himself on direct examination, so the prosecutor could not steal the sunshine on 
his cross-examination. This study nevertheless used this structure for three 
interrelated reasons. First, we wanted to ensure that the only difference 
between the two conditions was the identity of the party revealing the 
information, and that all other things (for example, stage of trial and context) 
were equal. Second, this study is essentially a follow-up to stealing-thunder 
studies. Only if our methodology accords with that of previous studies, a 
systematic comparison of the two tactics will be possible in the long run. Third 
and foremost, the current study tests the effectiveness of the tactic, not the 
likelihood of a particular manner of its utilization. The only relevant question is 
whether the tactic is generally viable, and we believe that it is: The prosecutor 
in a criminal trial can definitely steal the defendant’s sunshine, at times in the 
exact manner presented in our Stealing Sunshine condition. He can do so in at 
least three ways. The prosecutor presents the initial opening statement,45 so he 
can steal the defendant’s sunshine at this stage. The prosecutor can also do so 
on direct examination of one of the prosecution witnesses. Lastly, the 
prosecutor can steal the defendant’s sunshine on cross-examination of the latter 
if the positive information has not been presented on direct examination of the 
defendant for some reason,46 and the defense attorney is likely to reveal it on 
redirect examination or at a later stage.47 
 
 44. Dolnik et al., supra note 10, at 271. 
 45. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7(a) (3d ed. 2000). 
 46. For instance, the defense attorney may reserve some of the positive information about the 
defendant for later stages in order to take advantage of the recency effect. See Kurt A. Carlson & J. 
Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 91, 
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After reading highlights of the case and the trial transcript, participants 
answered several questions about their perceptions of the defendant and the 
victim. They were asked to determine whether the defendant was guilty, and to 
evaluate (on a 1–10 scale, 1 being the lowest estimate) the measure of the 
defendant’s guilt, the defendant’s credibility and remorse, their sympathy for 
the victim and for the defendant, and their identification with the victim and 
with the defendant. Finally, they were required to assign the proper punishment 
(0–10 years in prison). These measures served as the dependent variables. 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted on an individual basis. Each 
subject received a link to an online questionnaire that included one of two 
descriptions of the particular case. As explained, some participants were 
exposed to the Sunshine condition (that is, the defendant’s revelation of 
positive information about himself) and others were exposed to the Stealing 
Sunshine condition (that is, the prosecutor’s revelation of the same positive 
information about the defendant). This study examined the effects of stealing 
sunshine by comparing the means of the dependent variables for the two 
groups. 
A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was employed to test whether 
there were clusters of variables. A PCA is a mathematical procedure that 
transforms a large number of interrelated variables into a smaller number of 
uncorrelated variables (“principal components”), which are ordered so that the 
first few retain most of the variation present in all the original variables.48 The 
main applications of this technique are: (1) to reduce the number of variables 
and (2) to detect structure in the relationships between variables, that is, to 




Nine measures were used to study the impact of Stealing Sunshine. Table 1 
displays participants’ verdicts and perceptions of the parties for each of the two 
conditions (Sunshine or Stealing Sunshine). Note that the first dependent 








99 (2001) (finding “consistent evidence of a recency effect in the impact of the trial information for 
both prospective jurors and students . . . .”). 
 47. For example, it might be revealed during the sentencing procedure. 
 48. See IAN JOLLIFFE, PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 1 (2d ed. 2002). 
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Variable Label Scale M SD M SD 
Guilt Do you think 
the defendant is 
guilty?  
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
0.67 0.477 0.80 0.405 





1 = Definitely 
Not Guilty 
10 = Definitely 
Guilty 
5.64 2.367 6.82 2.341 





Years in Jail 
3.71 2.874 5.08 3.277 





1 = Not Credible 
10 = Very 
Credible 
6.57 2.188 6.62 2.761 





1 = No Remorse 
10 = Deep 
Remorse 
7.10 2.377 6.45 2.726 
Sympathy_Defendant How much 
sympathy did 
you feel for the 
defendant? 
1–10 
1 = Low 
10 = High 
5.10 2.325 6.02 2.626 
Sympathy_Victim How much 
sympathy did 
you feel for the 
victim? 
1–10 
1 = Low 
10 = High 
8.55 1.656 8.02 2.391 






1 = Low 
10 = High 
4.81 3.094 3.84 2.982 
Identification_Victim What was your 
level of 
identification 
with the victim? 
1–10 
1 = Low 
10 = High 
5.02 2.937 3.88 2.830 
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To examine the efficacy of stealing sunshine, this study compared the means 
of evaluations of participants exposed to the Sunshine condition with those of 
participants exposed to the Stealing Sunshine condition. To detect a possible 
association between the condition and the first dichotomous variable (guilty or 
not guilty), this study used a Chi-Square test, and found no significant 
difference between the two conditions. 
To examine the differences between the two conditions in other variables, 
this study used independent-samples t-tests. Thus, an independent-samples t-
test revealed a significant difference between the two conditions in the measure 
of guilt [t(80)=–2.27; p<0.05].
49 The mean measure of guilt in the Stealing Sunshine 
condition (M=6.83, SD=2.34) was significantly higher than in the Sunshine 
condition (M=5.64, SD=2.37). The difference between the two conditions in 
expected punishment also proved significant [t(80)=–2.00; p<0.05]. The mean 
duration of incarceration in the Stealing Sunshine condition (M=5.08, SD=3.28) 
was significantly higher than in the Sunshine condition (M=3.71, SD=2.87). 
The difference between the two conditions in sympathy for the defendant 
proved marginally significant [t(80)=–1.70; p=0.09]. Sympathy for the defendant in 
the Stealing Sunshine condition (M=6.03, SD=2.63) was greater than in the 
Sunshine condition (M=5.10, SD=2.33).50 This study also found a marginally 
significant difference between the two conditions in identification with the 
victim [t(80)=1.79; p=0.07]. Identification with the victim in the Stealing Sunshine 














 49. We used Levene’s test for equality of variances before comparing the samples’ means. Levene’s 
test is an inferential statistic used to assess the equality of variance in different samples. The null 
hypothesis tested by Levene’s test is that the two variances are equal. Howard Levene, Robust Tests for 
Equality of Variances, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
HAROLD HOTELLING 278 (Ingram Olkin et al. eds., 1960). Because the p-value of Levene’s test in our 
case was greater than the critical value (0.05), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and we can 
assume that the variances are not statistically different. 
 50. Cf. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 1, at 1387 (finding a statistically significant negative 
association between sympathy for defendants’ and jurors’ knowledge of defendants’ criminal records). 
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Figure 1: A Comparison of Means in the Two Conditions (significant or 















 Finally, an independent-samples t-test yielded no significant differences 
between the two conditions in the remaining four variables, namely defendant’s 
credibility, defendant’s remorse, sympathy for the victim, and identification 
with the defendant.51 
To identify clusters of dependent discrete variables, a PCA was employed. 
This study assumed independence of the components, and applied varimax 
orthogonal rotation. Not surprisingly, this study identified three components 
(according to the Kaiser criterion).52 The loadings after the orthogonal rotation 
are presented in Table 2. The first component, hereinafter “Operative 
Component,” included two variables: measure of guilt and punishment. This 
component explained 31.02% of the total variance. The second component, 
hereinafter “Attitude toward the Defendant,” included defendant’s credibility, 
defendant’s remorse, sympathy for the defendant, and identification with the 
defendant. It accounted for 18.09% of the variance. The third component, 
hereinafter “Attitude toward the Victim,” included sympathy for the victim and 
identification with the victim, and explained 13.15% of the variance. All three 





 51. To examine the condition’s effect on the overall reaction to the case, a multivariate analysis of 
variance (MANOVA) was performed. The condition exerted a significant impact on the multi-
dependent variable that contained all dependent variables. However, this finding may be attributed to 
the condition’s strong impact on a few dependent variables, and therefore does not add much to the 
analysis. 
 52. The Kaiser criterion is a method for selecting the appropriate number of principal components. 
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Table 2: Loadings of Variables on the Components after Rotation 
Variable Component 
  1 2 3 
Punishment 0.889   
Measure of guilt 0.876   
Sympathy_Defendant  0.808  
Credibility  0.794  
Identification_Defendant  0.539  
Remorse  0.413  
Identification_Victim   0.830 
Sympathy_Victim   0.638 
 
To examine the effect of stealing sunshine on the overall reaction to the 
case, a multivariate analysis (MANOVA) was performed using Hotelling’s 
trace criterion. The condition (Sunshine or Stealing Sunshine) exerted a 
significant impact on the multi-dependent-variable that contained the three 
components [F(3,78)=4.22, p<0.01]. This study found a significant difference 
between the two conditions in the Operative Component [Univariate 
F(1,81)=5.76, p<0.05, Adj R²=0.06]. The value of the Operative Component in 
the Sunshine condition (M=4.68, SD=2.42) was lower than in the Stealing 
Sunshine condition (M=5.95, SD=2.37). In addition, this study found a 
significant difference between the two conditions in Attitude toward the Victim 
[Univariate F(1,81)=4.20, p<0.05, Adj R²=0.04]. The value of this component in 
the Sunshine condition (M=6.83, SD=1.91) was higher than in the Stealing 
Sunshine condition (M=5.95, SD=1.99). Finally, this study found no significant 
difference between the two conditions in Attitude toward the Defendant 
[Univariate F(1,81)=0.09, not significant]. 
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V 
DISCUSSION 
This is the first empirical study of the effectiveness of the so-called stealing 
sunshine technique. The results support the hypothesis that disclosing 
information that seems advantageous to one’s opponent, before the latter elicits 
or reveals it himself, mitigates its impact on fact-finders’ decisions. The 
immediate practical implications of this study are self-evident: Volunteering 
positive information about the client’s opponent may benefit the client, and 
may therefore be consistent with the attorney’s fundamental duty of zealous 
advocacy, at least under certain circumstances.53 
This study tested the use of the tactic by the prosecution in a criminal case, 
and found that the mean measure of guilt and the mean duration of 
incarceration in the Stealing Sunshine condition were significantly higher than 
in the Sunshine condition. The difference between the two conditions with 
respect to the ultimate verdict (namely the dichotomous variable) was 
statistically insignificant, yet consistent with the hypothesis. Larger samples may 
yield a significant finding. To conclude, the prosecutor may benefit from using 
the tactic when possible.54 
The study also found that sympathy for the defendant in the Stealing 
Sunshine condition was greater than in the Sunshine condition.55 This marginally 
significant finding conforms to the positive teller–listener extremity effect.56 It 
also indicates that the tactic does not work by reducing fact-finders’ sympathy 
for the defendantit actually worked despite an increase in sympathy for the 
defendant. Similarly, the study found that identification with the victim in the 
Stealing Sunshine condition was weaker than in the Sunshine condition, 
suggesting that the tactic does not work by increasing identification with the 
victim.57 It worked despite a reduction in identification with the victim. The 
differences between the two conditions in the other variables were not 
significant. 
Despite its apparent contribution to existing literature on persuasion 
techniques, this is a preliminary study. Additional studies are necessary to 
substantiate our basic finding. In particular, future research should test the 
hypothesis with a more representative sample of the population of interest (that 
is, potential fact-finders) to increase the external validity of the results. Special 
 
 53. A U.S. litigator should bear in mind, however, that “a party introducing evidence cannot 
complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 
755 (2000); Perrin, supra note 7, at 647, 650–51. 
 54. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 45, at § 24.7(a); Carlson & Russo, supra note 46; see also supra 
text accompanying note 47. 
 55. We emphasize that this finding is only marginally significant, as explained in Part IV. We 
report and discuss it here due to the relatively small size of our sample. 
 56. See Inman et al., supra note 39, at 59–65, 73; see also supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 57. Again, this finding is only marginally significant, and we report and discuss it here due to the 
relatively small size of our sample. 
PERRY & WEIMANN SAKS 2/25/2011  
46 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:33 
attention should be given to three features of our sample that reflect the nature 
of the student body of the psychology department at the University of Haifa: (1) 
gender imbalance (73.2% of the participants were women); (2) limited age 
range (17 through 35); and (3) participants’ education. We tend to believe that 
these factors are not responsible for the results, but only larger and more 
representative samples would enable comparison between different gender, 
age, and education groups. 
Although there is now reason to believe that stealing sunshine is an effective 
tactic, it is not certain why that is so. In the Stealing Sunshine condition, the 
prosecution revealed the positive information about the defendant without a 
negative spin (framing). The results, therefore, do not support the argument 
that framing underlies the efficacy of the tactic. Similarly, the fact that in the 
Stealing Sunshine condition the defendant did not repeat the positive 
information undermines the “old news is no news” argument. This study 
showed that stealing the defendant’s sunshine did not impair the defendant’s 
credibility, but perhaps it improved the prosecutor’s overall image and hence, 
the prosecutor’s persuasiveness. Furthermore, we need to examine whether in 
cases of stealing sunshine, fact-finders change the meaning of the representation 
to better fit their expectation. 
Further research is required to delineate the boundaries of the tactic’s 
effectiveness in a given context. We need to determine, inter alia, whether the 
tactic’s effectiveness depends on the exact timing of its use (namely early or 
relatively late in trial), on the intensity of the sunshine stolen, on the personal 
characteristics of the stealer or the fact-finder, or on the non-use of specific 
counterstrategies. 
Finally, further research is necessary to determine whether the tactic is also 
effective in civil trials, and—perhaps more importantly—in non-legal contexts, 
such as advertising, interpersonal relationships, organizational crisis 
management, and politics. As explained above, “stealing thunder” was initially 
studied as a courtroom technique, but subsequently proved effective in other 
fields.58 We conjecture that the efficacy of stealing sunshine similarly transcends 




 58. See supra notes 20–22. 
